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We introduce worker di®erences in labor supply, re°ecting di®erences in skills and
assets, into a model of separations, matching, and unemployment over the business
cycle. Separating from employment when unemployment duration is long is particularly
costly for workers with high labor supply. This provides a rich set of testable predictions
across workers: those with higher labor supply, say due to lower assets, should display
more procyclical wages and less countercyclical separations. Consequently, the model
predicts that the pool of unemployed will sort toward workers with lower labor supply in
a downturn. Because these workers generate lower rents to employers, this discourages
vacancy creation and exacerbates the cyclicality of unemployment and unemployment
durations. We examine wage cyclicality and employment separations over the past
twenty years for workers in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
Wages are much more procyclical for workers who work more. This pattern is mirrored
in separations; separations from employment are much less cyclical for those who work
more. We do see for recessions a strong compositional shift among those unemployed
toward workers who typically work less.
¤We thank Evgenia Dechter for her excellent research assistance; we thank Mark Aguiar, Ricardo Lagos,
and Randy Wright for helpful suggestions.1. Introduction
Many authors have emphasized the role of wage rigidities in business cycle °uctuations. Most
recently, Shimer (2004), Hall (2005a), and Gertler and Trigari (2006) show how restricting
wage responses in a model with search frictions can greatly magnify cyclical °uctuations in
unemployment. This work is motivated by ¯ndings, particularly in Shimer (2005a), that a
calibrated Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model with °exible wages yields much less cyclical-
ity in unemployment and unemployment durations relative to wages than seen in the data.
But judging the empirical rigidity of wages relative to model predictions is precarious. The
prediction that wages are strongly procyclical assumes: (a) that the shocks driving labor
°uctuations act largely by shifting labor demand, and (b) that workers do not easily substi-
tute between market and non-market activities. These assumptions are not readily tested.1
Most acutely, testing the model prediction relies on having a genuine measure of cyclical
movements in the price of labor. Although measured aggregate real wages are relatively
acyclical, wage rates for new hires are much more procyclical, as we document below. The
key measure of labor cost for vacancy creation is the anticipated value of wages over the life
of the employment match. If wages are smoothed relative to the shadow price of labor (e.g.,
Hall, 1980), this cost can vary considerably without corresponding movements in aggregate
real wages.2
A more robust prediction of wage °exibility is that employment decisions are driven by
comparative advantage. For this reason, we focus on our model's prediction for wage and
employment cyclicality across workers. More precisely, we introduce worker heterogeneity in
labor supply into a business cycle model of separations, matching, and unemployment under
°exible wages. Workers with relatively high skill or low assets are predicted to have low
reservation match qualities in order to stay in an employed match; these are workers with
high labor supply. Recessions are times of longer unemployment duration. A worker who
1Related to (a) a number of potential cyclical shocks, for instance investment-speci¯c technology shocks
(e.g., Fisher, 2006), act in general equilibrium by shifting marginal rates of substitution as much as through
labor's marginal product. Related to (b) Hagedorn-Manovski (2005) discuss parameterizing the MOrtensen-
Pissarides model, especially valuing payo®s to non-market activities such that the model matches the relative
volatilities of unemployment and wages.
2Kudyak (2006) illustrates this point based on regressions estimated on NLSY data that specify wages,
as in Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), to be a function of the unemployment rate when starting a job or the
lowest unemployment rate since starting a job.
1desires high labor supply will avoid separating into unemployment during these downturns{
entering unemployment when unemployment duration is long is antithetical to high labor
supply. This yields our key model predictions: Workers with high desired labor supply will
exhibit more cyclical wages and less cyclical separations. We examine these predictions
for workers in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). As predicted by
our model, wages are much more procyclical for workers who work more with this pattern
mirrored by separations that are much less countercyclical.
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we model employment matches as facing changes
in match quality, with bad draws possibly leading to endogenous separations. We depart
from Mortensen and Pissarides in two important ways. We allow for diminishing utility in
market goods, imperfect insurance as in Aiyagari (1994), and for leisure from not working;
as a result, the incentive to trade work for search is increasing in a worker's wealth. We also
depart from Mortensen and Pissarides by allowing for worker heterogeneity: Workers di®er
in assets, re°ecting past work histories, and di®er in human capital.
Once a role for labor supply is allowed in separations, it naturally leads to di®ering
separation decisions along the lines of comparative advantage. In our model, these di®erences
take two forms. Workers with lower savings, and therefore lower consumption, are less
willing to separate in the face of high unemployment. We reinforce this impact of savings by
constraining allowable borrowing. Secondly workers with higher human capital are modeled
to have a comparative advantage in market work, making them less willing to separate into
unemployment. These factors of low savings and high market skill, ones associated with
high labor supply in settings without search frictions, produce a comparative disadvantage
in separating to unemployment during a recession. Our model employs °exible wage setting.
Workers with higher labor supply, say due to lower savings, are more willing to take a
wage cut in recessions to maintain employment. This generates a prediction for wages that
inversely mirrors that in separations{workers with higher labor supply should exhibit more
cyclical wages as well as less cyclical separations.
Shimer (2005a), Hall (2005a), and Costain and Reiter (2003) have each argued that
reasonable calibrations of standard search and matching models with °exible wages yield
predictions dramatically at odds with the data{the models generate much more procyclical
wages and much less procyclical job ¯nding rates than observed. Wage-setting rigidities
2can mute the inducement from lowered wages to create vacancies during recessions. Our
model, despite °exible wage setting, produces an e®ect that, qualitatively like wage rigid-
ity, suppresses vacancy creation in recessions. When unemployment duration increases in a
downturn this shifts separations, and thereby the pool of unemployed, toward workers with
low labor supply. Creating vacancies for these workers is less attractive because their em-
ployment generates smaller expected surplus. For our model calibrations we ¯nd this cyclical
sorting can contribute importantly to cyclicality in unemployment and unemployment du-
rations. In the SIPP data, especially for men, we do see a strong compositional shift during
recessions among the unemployed toward workers who typically work less independently of
the stage of the cycle. We see a similar cyclical compositional shift among the set of workers
transiting from unemployed to employed. Thus the data support our model's prediction that
during recessions vacancies must draw from workers who exhibit lower labor supply.
After brie°y discussing selected related work, we present the model in the next sec-
tion. In Section 3 we calibrate the model to mimic average separation and unemployment
rates observed across skill groups. Results of model simulations are given with a focus on
cyclicality of wages and separations across workers by skill and assets. Our model gener-
ates considerable cyclical sorting into unemployment by workers' reservation match qualities
(labor supply). This sorting, together with the accompanying cyclicality of separations, ex-
acerbates unemployment volatility by a factor of about one-third. In Section 4, we introduce
the SIPP data and illustrate how separations behave cyclically. In Section 5 we compare
cross-worker patterns in wage cyclicality and cyclicality of separations to those predicted
by the model. We do see patterns consistent with our model of comparative advantage. In
particular, wages are more cyclical and separations from employment less cyclical for work-
ers who work more. Similarly consistent with the model, workers with few assets relative
to earnings show more cyclical wages and less cyclical employment separations, though this
latter e®ect is only marginally signi¯cant. Unlike our simulated model, we ¯nd that higher-
wage workers actually show more cyclical employment separations. The concluding section
discusses possible interpretations of this ¯nding.
Key to our model is that, because workers exhibit diminishing marginal utility in con-
sumption and face imperfect insurance, the match-separation decision depend on a worker's
wealth as well as match quality. Cyclicality of separations then hinges on the cross-sectional
3distribution of reservation match qualities, re°ecting individuals' savings and skills, which
cannot be addressed in a representative agent construct. In a related model that abstracts
from search frictions, Chang and Kim (2006, 2007) show that the cross-sectional distributions
of wealth and productivity play a critical role in determining the elasticity of aggregate labor
supply in a competitive equilibrium. Nakajima (2007) and Shao and Silos (2007) have also
recently adopted diminishing marginal utility in consumption and imperfect risk sharing into
the Mortensen-Pissarides model.3 However, Nakajima does not allow for heterogeneous pro-
ductivity; and neither paper allows for bargaining between individual workers and ¯rms or
endogenous separation. These elements give us a much richer set of predictions for cyclicality
in wages and separations across workers and generate our result that unemployment sorts
toward workers with lower labor supply in a downturn, magnifying cyclicality in vacancies
and unemployment. Previous papers have argued that lower job-¯nding rates during reces-
sions may re°ect a compositional shift toward workers who display lower job-¯nding rates
regardless of the stage of the cycle. Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1985) and Baker (1992)
focus on a possible role for increased separations for prime-age males during recessions. Pries
(forthcoming) considers the possibility that low-skilled workers exhibit, exogenously, sepa-
rations skewed more toward recessions. (He also explores how this a®ects vacancy creation.)
Unlike these earlier papers, our shift in unemployment toward workers with low labor sup-
ply, high reservation matches, is predicted by the model rather than imposed exogenously.
More importantly, we show in the SIPP data a strong compositional shift during recessions
toward workers who work less independently of the business cycle. By contrast, Shimer
(2005b) reports no systematic cyclical shifts in the age or skill of the unemployment pool
based on CPS data. (Nor do we see any from the SIPP data.) Finally, our empirical work
contributes to the literatures on the cyclical behavior of real wages and employment sepa-
rations. Our focus, motivated by our model predictions, is how this behavior di®ers across
workers. To our knowledge, we are the ¯rst to examine how wage cyclicality depend on work-
ers' long-term labor supply and assets.4 Several studies of household data have suggested
3Other papers that entertain wealth e®ects in modeling search include Pissarides (1987), Gomez, Green-
wood, and Rebelo (2001), and Hall (2006).
4We also examine how wage cyclicality varies by a worker's long-term wage and by whether the worker
is newly hired. Several papers, including recently Castro and Coen-Pirani (2007) examine wage cyclicality
by schooling levels. Our results that wages are much more cyclical for new hires reinforces ¯ndings by Bils
(1985), Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), and Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007).
4that separations are relatively less cyclical than job ¯nding rates.5 Our ¯ndings support this
picture while showing important di®erences across workers, notably that workers who work
less show separations skewed toward recessions.
2. Model
We develop a variant of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Our model departs from
Mortensen-Pissarides in three important ways. First, workers are risk averse. Second, they
face a borrowing constraint. Third, workers are heterogenous in their ability to produce in
the market.
2.1. Environment
There are H types of workers whose earnings ability in the market (human capital) is denoted
by h. For each type h, there is a continuum of in¯nitely-lived workers with total mass equal
to one. We assume that the markets are segmented by h; but the economic environment is
comparable across markets. A worker's market productivity is proportional to h. Here we
describe the economic environment of one market without explicitly denoting h.6
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where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor, and ct(> 0) is consumption. The parameter B
denotes the utility from leisure when unemployed. lt is 1 when unemployed and otherwise
zero. In Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and many extensions, there is no valuation of
leisure; so a marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is not de¯ned.
Here the marginal rate of substitution (c¡°=B ) is decreasing in c. This provides the basis for
a worker's reservation match quality to be increasing in consumption and thereby savings.
Each period a worker either works (employed) or searches for a job (unemployed). A
worker, when working, earns wage w. If unemployed, a worker receives an unemployment
5Examples are Sider (1985), Baker (1992), Nagypal (2004), Shimer (2005a), and Hall (2005b). Fujita and
Ramey (2006) ¯nd an important cyclical role of °uctuations in both separation and ¯nding rates.
6When considering di®erences in human capital, this environment is extended to allow the cost of posting
a vacancy and unemployment income to depend on the worker's human capital. This is described in detail
in calibrating.
5bene¯t b. Each can borrow or lend at a given real interest rate r by trading the asset a. But
there is a limit, a, that one can borrow; that is at > a. Real interest rate r is determined
exogenously to °uctuations in this particular economy (small open economy).
There is also a continuum of identical agents we refer to as entrepreneurs (or ¯rms). En-
trepreneurs have the ability to create job vacancies with a cost · per vacancy. Entrepreneurs
are risk neutral (diversifying ownership of their investments across many vacancies and across









There are two technologies in this economy, one that describes the production of output
by a matched worker-entrepreneur pair and another that describes the process by which
workers and entrepreneurs become matched. A matched pair produces output:
yt = ztxth
where zt is aggregate productivity and xt is idiosyncratic match-speci¯c productivity. Both
aggregate productivity and idiosyncratic productivity evolve over time according to the
Markov process Pr[zt+1 < z0jzt = z] = D(z0jz) and Pr[xt+1 < x0jxt = x] = F(x0jx), re-
spectively. For newly formed matches, idiosyncratic productivity starts at the mean value
of the unconditional distribution, which is denoted by ¹ x. In addition to productivity shocks,
each matched pair faces a probability of destruction of match ¸ at the end of period.
In each skill market, the number of new meetings between the unemployed and vacancies




where v is the number of vacancies and u is the number of unemployed workers for that skill
market. The matching rate for an unemployed worker is p(µ) = m(v;u)=u = ´µ®, where
µ = v=u is the vacancy-unemployment ratio, the labor market tightness. The probability
that a vacant job matches with a worker is q(µ) = m(v;u)=v = ´µ®¡1.
A matched worker-¯rm constitutes a bilateral monopoly. We assume the wage is set by
bargaining between the worker and ¯rm over the match surplus. This is discussed in the
next subsection. The match surplus re°ects the value of the match relative to the summed
6worker's value of being unemployed and the entrepreneur's value of an unmatched vacancy
(which is zero in equilibrium). There are no bargaining rigidities; separations are e±cient
for the worker-¯rm pair, occurring if and only if match surplus falls below zero.
The timing of events can be summarized as follows:
1. At the beginning of each period, matching outcomes from the previous period's search
and matching are realized. Also aggregate productivity z and each match's idiosyn-
cratic productivity x is realized.
2. Upon observing x and z; matched workers and entrepreneurs decide whether to con-
tinue (or commence) as an employed match. Workers breaking up with an entrepreneur
become unemployed. (There is no later recall of matches.)
3. For employed matches, production takes place with the wage re°ecting worker-¯rm
bargaining. Also at this time, unemployed and vacancies engage in the search/matching
process.
4. After production, a fraction ¸ of employed matches are destroyed.
It is useful to consider a recursive representation. Let W, U, J, and V respectively denote
the values of employed, unemployed, matched job, and vacancy. All value functions depend
on the measures of workers. In each labor market, two measures capture the distribution of
workers: ¹(a;x) and Ã(a), respectively, represent the measures of workers engaged in work
and unemployed engaged in search during the period.7 The evolution of these measures is
given by T, i.e., (¹0;Ã0) = T(¹;Ã;z). For notational convenience, let s = (z;¹;Ã).
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7Let A and X denote sets of all possible realizations of a and x, respectively. Then ¹(a;x) is de¯ned over


























For an entrepreneur the value of a matched job is:
J(a;x;s) = zxh ¡ w(a;x;s)





0)gjx;z] + ¯¸V (s
0):
(3)
The value of a vacancy is:







u) + ¯(1 ¡ q(µ(s)))V (s
0); (4)
where recall that · is the vacancy posting cost and q(µ) is the probability that a vacancy
is ¯lled. e Ã(a0
u) denotes the measure of unemployed workers at the end of a period after the
asset accumulation decision is made.
2.2. Wage Bargaining
There is a setting for bilateral bargaining between a matched vacancy and worker. We follow











S(a;x;s) = W(a;x;s) ¡ U(a;s) + J(a;x;s) ¡ V (s);
for all (a;x;s). Rubinstein (1982) demonstrates in a stationary environment that the Nash
solution can be interpreted as the outcome of a noncooperative game with sequential o®ers.
In our stochastic setting without linear utility this interpretation does not literally hold
8(Coles and Wright, 1998.) We adopt the Nash solution, however, partly for comparability
with the related literature.
The Nash solution can generate a wage that is increasing in a worker's assets, re°ecting
that the value being unemployed is less painful for a worker with greater assets. (Below see
Figure 1.) In turn, this makes the vacancy creation decision depend on the assets of the
unemployed and, more generally, any characteristic a®ecting the reservation wage for the
pool of unemployed. We believe these features potentially generalize to settings with wage
posting by ¯rms and directed search by workers. For instance, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)
model directed search by risk averse workers. They show that if workers are less risk averse
the distribution of posted wages exhibits a higher mean as well as longer queues, as a worker
is less willing to take a lower wage in order to raise the probability of employment. We would
expect increased assets for the unemployed, for given risk aversion, to exhibit comparative
statics in this same direction in their setting.
2.3. Evolution of measures




















































for all A0 ½ A and X0 ½ X.
2.4. Equilibrium
In each market, for worker skill h, the equilibrium consists of a set of value functions,
W(a;x;s), U(a;s), J(a;x;s), a set of decision rules for consumption ce(a;x;s), cu(a;s),
9asset holdings a0
e(a;x;s), a0
u(a;s), and separating x¤(a;x;s), the wage schedule w(a;x;s), the
labor-market tightness µ(s), and a law of motion for the distribution, (¹0;Ã0) = T(¹;Ã;z).
Equilibrium is de¯ned by the following.
1. (Optimal Savings): Given µ, w, ¹ , Ã, and T, a0 solves the Bellman equations for W,
U, J and V in (1), (2), (3), and (4).
2. (Optimal Separation): Given W, U, J, V , ¹, Ã, and T, x¤ satis¯es S(a;x¤;s) = 0.
3. (Nash Bargaining): Given W, U, J and V , w satis¯es (5).
4. (Free Entry): Given w, x¤;J, ¹, Ã, and T, the vacancies are posted until V = 0.
5. (Rational Expectations): Given a0
e, a0
u and x¤, the law of motion for distribution
(¹0;Ã0) = T(¹;Ã) is described in (6) and (7).
3. Model Predictions
We calibrate our model in order to present its predictions for business cycle °uctuations. For
expositional purposes, we proceed in two steps. We ¯rst calibrate the model for an economy
with a single human capital level. We display the steady-state properties of the model, in
particular showing how assets of the unemployed a®ect their reservation wages and the value
to ¯rms of hiring. We examine business cycles generated by the model, emphasizing the role
of cyclical sorting into unemployment by reservation wage. Secondly, we calibrate the model
across multiple skill groups. We examine how this a®ects predicted aggregate °uctuations.
We particularly focus on predictions for cyclicality of wages and separations across workers
by labor supply (reservation match quality). We do so in anticipation of our analysis of the
micro SIPP data.
3.1. Calibration for benchmark economy
We ¯rst illustrate the model for a single human capital level. In addition to targeting the
level of unemployment, we target that the standard deviation of unemployment be about ten
times the standard deviation in productivity to re°ect the ratio of these standard deviations
reported by Shimer (2005a). Note that, since we calibrate to match the relative volatilities
10of unemployment and productivity, we are clearly not claiming that the model, indepen-
dently calibrated, generates the volatility of unemployment and related moments highlighted
by Shimer. Instead we study from the model simulations how shutting down our model's
systematic separations by low labor-supply workers in recession a®ects our ability to match
these moments. We do ¯nd that our model captures considerable volatility from its endoge-
nous separations.
Starting with preferences, we assume a relative risk aversion ° equal to one. We choose a
discount factor ¯ so the model economy displays an average level of assets equal to 18 months
of labor earnings. This is about the median ratio of net worth to family earnings reported
in the SIPP data. For our model simulations, we assume an annualized real interest rate of
6 percent. The monthly discount factor ¯ of 0.99481 achieves a average asset-earnings ratio
of 18. The borrowing constraint has a relatively small impact on average asset holdings. We
set the borrowing constraint to six times the worker's human capital, so approximately six
month's labor income, as we see few households in the SIPP with unsecured debt exceeding
this amount.
The key outcomes we target are the level and cyclical volatility of the unemployment rate.
We target an average unemployment rate of 6 percent . We choose a monthly separation
rate of 2 percent. This is roughly consistent with rates we report for the SIPP data below.
We assume that half of separations are exogenous, so ¸ = 0:01.8 Given an unemployment
rate of 6 percent, the separation rate of 2 percent implies a steady-state job ¯nding rate,
of 0.313. This is consistent with hazards reported by Meyer (1990). The vacancy posting
cost · is chosen so that the vacancy-unemployment ratio (µ) is normalized to 1 in the steady
state. The matching technology is Cobb-Douglas; m(v;u) = :313v®u1¡® hits the steady-
state ¯nding rate. We set the matching power parameter, ®, to 0.5.
For aggregate productivity shocks we use ½z = 0:95 and ¾z = 0:0037. This yields a
8Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) employ a breakdown of about two-thirds of separations being
exogenous. They base this on data suggesting that about two-thirds of separating workers attribute the
separation to a quit; and they choose to classify worker-labeled quits as exogenous separations. For the last
two panels of the SIPP, conditional on an individual separating from a job, the worker reports a reason for
the separation. We also see about two-thirds of separations are labeled by the worker as quits. But many
of these quits are to take another job, which does not speak to the model breakdown of exogenous versus
endogenous. Another important category of quits re°ect workers saying they did not like the pay or hours,
which would better ¯t deciding an endogenous separation. So we believe it is conservative to label half of
separations as endogenous.
11time series for (logged) TFP with autocorrelation of 0:965 and standard deviation, after HP
¯ltering, of 1%. This is smaller than the standard deviation reported by Shimer for U.S.
labor productivity, but is fairly consistent with the standard deviation for labor productivity
of 1.2% measured for 1984-2003 corresponding to the years of the SIPP data. Moreover, we
focus on discussing relative volatilities and correlations in describing the model results.
Remaining to calibrate are the returns received when unemployed and the magnitude of
match-speci¯c shocks. Both are key factors in determining the cyclical volatility of sepa-
rations and unemployment. When unemployed, persons receive the utility B from leisure
as well as unemployment insurance b. These parameter values de¯ne the surplus value of
employment. If unemployment is made more attractive, everything else equal, this clearly
leads to higher separation and unemployment rates. The return while being unemployed
is also key in generating unemployment volatility in the Mortensen and Pissarides frame-
work (Hagedorn and Manovski, 2005, and Mortensen and Nagypal, 2005){higher values for
b or B increase cyclical volatility of vacancies and unemployment. By contrast, greater
volatility of match-speci¯c productivity (higher ¾x) has opposite impacts on the level ver-
sus cyclical volatility of unemployment. Greater match shocks create more separations and
higher average unemployment, but actually reduce the cyclical volatility of separations and
unemployment. With greater match-quality shocks, workers become sorted over time into
matches with signi¯cant match surplus. This makes their separations less responsive to
cyclical °uctuations in productivity.
Turning to these parameters, ¯rst consider unemployment insurance, b. Shimer (2005a)
uses b = 0:4; but for his calibration, with linear utility, b should also capture utility bene¯ts
associated with unemployment from leisure or home production. Hall (2005b) shows that
the replacement rate has been about 10 to 15 percent in recent years. We set b = 0:25.
We view this as capturing partly unemployment insurance and partly home production
that substitutes nearly perfectly with purchased goods. We set the persistence of the match-
speci¯c shock to be quite high, ½x = 0:97. Finally, we vary the leisure value of unemployment
B and the volatility of innovations to match shocks ¾x to be consistent with both an average
unemployment rate of 6 percent (re°ecting an endogenous, as well as exogenous, separation
rate of 1 percent) and a standard deviation of unemployment that is ten times that of
productivity. This nails down these parameters because, as just discussed, the level of
12unemployment is increasing in both B and ¾x, but its cyclicality responds oppositely to the
two parameters. This is achieved by the combination of values B = 0:66 and ¾x = 0:0058.
An unemployed person would receive the same bene¯t from consuming leisure of B =
0:66 together with consumption of b = 0:25 as having no leisure and consumption of b =
0:48. This might make it seem that we have calibrated the value of being unemployed
comparably to Shimer's replacement rate of 40 percent. But this understates the relative
consumption of the unemployed, as the unemployed will consume from decumulating assets.
As a result, the surplus value of employment is smaller for our calibrated economy than
for Shimer's. A good way to compare across models with linear utility, such as Shimer's,
and our model without linear preferences is to look at the cost of a vacancy implied by
the model. In equilibrium this cost re°ects the surplus value of employment in output
units. For our benchmark economy the expected cost of hiring a worker is equal to one
week's output. So for a worker with earnings of $50,000 per year this translates into only
about $1,000 per hire. By our calculations, the comparable hiring cost from Shimer would
be about double this; so employment generates notably less surplus here. Related to this
point, when we calibrate our model with only exogenous separations, as in Shimer, we get
a standard deviation of (ln)unemployment that is 3.7 times that of productivity, whereas in
Shimer's model calibration (ln)unemployment is less volatile than productivity. As a second
point of caution, we note that a standard deviation of innovations to x of ¾x = 0:0058
yields relatively little dispersion in match quality as it implies, unconditional on selection,
a standard deviation of x of only 2.4%. Selection reduces this dispersion across actual
employments even further. In other words, we are able to calibrate our model to mimic
realistic levels and volatilities of unemployment, but only if hiring costs and match rents are
fairly low. We believe this is the right context, however, to judge our model's predictions.
The key feature of our model is that longer unemployment durations during recessions a®ect
workers di®erently depending on that worker's reservation match quality; so it is useful to
judge the model in the context of empirically relevant °uctuations in unemployment and
unemployment durations. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values for the benchmark
economy with h = 1.
133.2. Steady-state results
Some key model steady-state results that determine how our benchmark economy responds
to aggregate shocks are presented in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 displays the values of the
wage, W ¡ U; and J as functions of a worker's assets for each of ¯fteen potential values for
match quality x. Higher values of match quality are directly associated with higher wages
and capitalized value of employment W, while irrelevant for U. So both W ¡ U and J
correspondingly increase with x. Focusing on assets, both W and U increase with assets.
But having low assets particularly lowers the value of being unemployed, resulting in a lower
bargained wage. Figure 1 displays this positive relation between assets and wages. Both
W ¡ U and J (re°ecting the higher wage) decrease in worker assets.9 The sharpest positive
relation of the wage to assets, and opposite reaction in J, is concentrated at the very low
end of assets, near or below zero. But, as we see next, there is a very little mass at the these
very low asset levels.
Figure 2, top left, shows the density of assets for workers at each of three levels for match
quality ¹(a;x). For low match qualities, the distribution of assets is sharply truncated{only
matches with workers with low assets survive match qualities that low. Complementing this
result, endogenous separations skew the distribution of match qualities toward higher values
of match quality. This is shown in the lower-left panel of Figure 2. In particular, virtually no
workers remain in matches where x has fallen below 0.97. Combining these ¯rst two panels
yields the distribution of assets across all workers. This is shown in the upper-right panel
together with the density of assets for the unemployed, Ã(a). The dispersion in assets is
fairly small{both densities are largely contained between asset levels of 5 and 30 months of
earnings. The ¯nal panel of Figure 2 displays how a worker's critical value for match quality
x¤ depends on assets. This threshold for separating increases notably with assets at all asset
values; but the key for the response of separations to aggregate shocks is its responsiveness
for assets from 5 to 30 months earnings where the density is concentrated.
9J, equaling W ¡U times consumption, decreases less than W ¡U with assets. This is more relevant at
low asset levels, where consumption responds more to assets. For instance, for x = 1, an increase in assets
from 0 to 5 yields a 33 percent smaller drop in J than in W ¡ U.
143.3. Business cycle predictions
We next characterize the business cycles properties of the model in response to shocks to
productivity. With aggregate °uctuations, productivity z, and the measures of workers, ¹
and Ã, are state variables for agents' optimization problems, as separation decisions depend
on subsequent matching probabilities. These, in turn, depend on the next period's measures
of workers. Because it is not possible to keep track of the evolution of these measures,
we employ Krusell-Smith's (1998) \Bounded Rationality" method which approximates the
distribution of workers by a limited number of its moments. In particular, we assume that
agents make use of the average asset holdings of the economy and the fraction of workers who
are employed. (The computational appendix gives some more detail.). To produce business
cycle statistics, we generate 12,000 monthly periods for a model economy. After dropping the
¯rst 3,000 observations, we log and HP ¯lter the data (with smoothing parameter 900,000
to be comparable to Shimer, 2005) and generate business cycle statistics.
A sample portion of the cyclical simulation is displayed in Figure 3. Separations are
countercyclical. They also clearly lead the cycle, which is consistent with ¯ndings by Fujita
and Ramey (2006). We see that, consistent with the data, the model generates strikingly
opposite movements in unemployment and the job ¯nding rate.
Some key statistics are highlighted in Table 2. Results for our benchmark model with
endogenous separations are given in Column 2. For comparison, the ¯rst column reports
model statistics when we shut down all endogenous separations. (Innovations to match
quality are eliminated, while the exogenous destruction rate is doubled to 2%.) Also for
comparison, the last column reports the comparable statistics contained in Shimer (2005)
for quarterly U.S. data for 1951-2003, where note that all standard deviations are expressed
relative to that for labor productivity.
Shimer points out that the natural log of unemployment series exhibits volatility, mea-
sured by standard deviation, that is 9.5 times that in labor productivity, whereas in his cal-
ibrated model with constant exogenous separations the unemployment series displays lower
volatility by a factor of about one half. By contrast the version of our calibrated model with
only exogenous separations generations a standard deviation of unemployment that is 3.7
times that in productivity. The considerably greater volatility for unemployment here largely
15re°ects a lower surplus value of employment for our model. Thus it is important to frame
any contributions to unemployment volatility from the mechanisms in our model relative
to the results with exogenous separations in Column 1, rather than the larger disparities
framed by Shimer's calibration.
Turning to our model with endogenous turnover, by construction the model generates
observed volatility. In fact, its standard deviation of ln(unemployment), 10.5 percent, actu-
ally exceeds that in the data, 9.5 percent.10 (This occurs because we trade o® generating
excess volatility here versus generating not quite the observed volatility for the economy
with multiple skill groups discussed below.) Our model generates nearly three times the
volatility in unemployment compared to its calibration with constant separation rate. The
endogenous separations generate much more cyclical volatility for two reasons. For one, the
model generates countercyclical separations, correlation of 0:32 with unemployment, that
are quite volatile with a standard deviation slightly larger than that for ln(unemployment).
Secondly, the model generates considerable cyclical selection into separating to unemploy-
ment by worker assets. Consider the model with exogenous separations, Column 1. There
the correlation between the unemployment rate and the assets of unemployed relative to
employed is ¡0:48, re°ecting the drop in assets with longer unemployment durations during
recessions. With endogenous sorting this is reversed. The correlation between the unem-
ployment rate and the relative assets of unemployed is 0:77. This shift toward workers with
higher assets and higher reservation wages in recessions drives down the value of vacancy
creation.
To separately quantify the impact of countercyclical separations and cyclical sorting
by asset position, we construct a version of our calibrated model where separations are
exogenous, but these exogenous separations display the same time series properties as our
model with endogenous separations. To achieve this we ¯rst estimate a two-variable VAR
for productivity and the separation rate on data simulated from our model with endogenous
separations, where the separation rate depends on current and lagged productivity as well as
its own lag. We then employ the estimated VAR process to generate shocks for separations
as well as productivity for the model simulations. Moments from these model simulations
10The model also generates highly persistent °uctuations in unemployment and the ¯nding rate with
respective autocorrelations, even after the series are HP ¯ltered, of 0:94 and 0:93. The predicted separation
rate is much less persistent, with autocorrelation of 0:26:
16appear in Column 3 of Table 2. The model with purely exogenous separations does generate
considerably greater volatility than the model with constant exogenous separations, by a
factor greater than two. By comparison, the cyclical sorting into unemployment by assets
plays a more modest role. It does, however, increase the volatility of ln(unemployment) by
nearly 25 percent, from standard deviation 8.5 percentage points to 10.5.
Cyclical sorting into unemployment also serves to generate realistic cyclicality in the ¯nd-
ing rate. Our model with endogenous separations exhibits a standard deviation of the ¯nding
rate (5.6%) that is greater than either that for the model with constant separations (4.3%)
or with exogenous cyclical separations (4.4%) percent, and much closer in line with the data.
Our model, like the data, also displays a much stronger negative correlation between unem-
ployment and the ¯nding rate than the models with exogenous separations. Furthermore,
the model with cyclical, but exogenous separations, actually generates a positive correlation
between unemployment and vacancies of 0.28. This is opposite in sign to that of the Bev-
eridge empirical relation between unemployment and vacancies. Our model does generate
a negative correlation, though at ¡0:16 it is far weaker than observed in the data. It also
generates a negative correlation of the separation and ¯nding rates (¡0:35), though not as
negative as reported by Shimer (¡0:57).A particular empirical shortcoming to note for our
model of endogenous separations is that it generates less volatility in vacancies than observed
for unemployment, whereas empirical measures for vacancies appear to suggest a time series
as volatile as unemployment.
3.4. Calibrating across skill groups
We next extend the model simulations to consider three human capital levels: h = 0:75;1;4=3.
Each skill group forms matches in a distinct market. (These markets are independent given
constant returns to scale in production and an exogenous real interest rate.) We then ag-
gregate across the three groups to generate aggregate model statistics.
We calibrate several model parameters to depend on worker skill. A key parameter is how
the unemployment income bene¯t varies with respect to h.... Anderson and Meyer report
the level of unemployment bene¯ts by wage decile based on the 1993 panel of the SIPP
data. Bene¯ts, as a share of earnings, are much lower at higher wages. But unemployment
is also greatly skewed toward lower wage workers. If the breakdowns in bene¯ts by wage
17from Anderson and Meyer are viewed together with the breakdown in unemployment by
wage we report below, this suggests an elasticity of unemployment bene¯ts with respect to
wage that is close to one. There are arguments for the elasticity being less than literally one.
Most states cap the size of unemployment insurance bene¯ts. Secondly, not all the bene¯t
b should be interpreted as unemployment insurance. If unemployed workers can engage in
home activities that substitute for market purchases (e.g., sealing their own driveway), this
component of non-market time acts like a substitute for market income. Presumably skill at
such home tasks exhibits an elasticity with respect to market ability of less than one. Based
on these considerations, we set the elasticity of b with respect to h at 0:75.
We let the recruitment cost depend on, but be less than proportional to, human capital,
· = ¹ ·h0:5. (A recruiting cost proportional to human capital generates counterfactual. lower
¯nding rates for high-skilled workers.)
Given that model asset holdings partly re°ect precautionary savings, and unemployment
is greater among low-skilled workers, the model, with a common discount factor, would
incorrectly predict higher assets for low-skilled workers. To o®set this, we employ a slightly
higher discount rate for lower-skilled workers so as to yield assets equal to about 18 month's
wages for each skill group. The required di®erences in ¯ are very small, with annualized
discount rates respectively of 6:45%, 6:24%, and 6:18% (¯ = 0:99464;0:99481;0:99486) for
skill groups h = 0:75;1;4=3.
With only these di®erences by skill group, the model economy exhibits unemployment
rates that vary only modestly by skill (unemployment rates of 6:9%, 6:0%, and 5:3% respec-
tively for h = 0:75;1;4=3). But we show below that lower-wage workers have much higher
separation and unemployment rates. To be consistent with that evidence, we target unem-
ployment rates for our three skill groups of respectively 10%, 6%, and 5%. To achieve this
we allow for lower wage workers to exhibit a higher rate of exogenous job separations and
greater variability of match-quality shocks. We target that half of separations be exogenous
regardless of skill group. This requires respective values of ± of 1:8%, 1%, and 0:9% from
low to high skill. To achieve the observed dispersion in unemployment by skill also requires
higher endogenous separations for the low-wage group of workers, dictating values of ¾x of
0:98% for h = 0:75, with ¾x retaining the value of 0:58% for h = 1 and 4=3.11
11Higher match volatility for less skilled workers implies that they exhibit more wage volatility, independent
18An alternative for generating much higher separation and unemployment rates for less-
skilled workers is to raise their relative value of income when not employed. But we see this
as unattractive for several reason. For one, it requires setting the elasticity of unemployment
bene¯ts with respect to h down to 0:2, which is very counterfactual. Secondly, it generates
much lower ¯nding rates for less-skilled workers, which is not consistent with the data as
discussed below. Finally, it generates much less wage cyclicality and much more cyclicality
in separations for less-skilled workers. Both these predictions are counter what we see in the
data.
3.5. Business cycles predictions across skill groups
We present model business cycle results with heterogeneous skill groups in two parts. We
¯rst examine predicted aggregate business cycle. We then use the model to generate a panel
data set of workers' wages and separation decisions. From this arti¯cial data we illustrate
how cyclicality of wages and separations predictably di®er across workers' assets and skill
levels.
The ¯rst three columns of Table 3 present predictions for business cycles for each of
the three skill groups (h = 0:75, 1 and 4=3). The fourth column gives statistics for the
aggregated model economy, that is an economy that aggregates the three groups. Looking
¯rst at the steady-state properties, the calibrated model generates considerable heterogeneity
in separation rates and unemployment rates by skill. Comparing the highest h group to
lowest, the average wage is higher by 58 percent, the unemployment and separation rates
are lower by 75 and 58 percent respectively, with the ¯nding rate 24 percent higher. These
di®erences are fairly close to the cross-sectional di®erences we report below for the SIPP
data.
Our calibrated model generates similar volatility in unemployment across the skill groups.
The natural log of unemployment rate is 8.0, 10.5, and 9.3 times as volatile as productivity
for h = 0:75, 1 and 4=3. Note that this does not imply that employment is equally cyclical
across the groups. The least-skilled group has a standard deviation of employment that is
double that of the high-skilled. The lower cyclical volatility of ln(unemployment) for the
of aggregate °uctuations. In the SIPP data we do, in fact, see greater wage volatility for workers with lower
average long-term wages.
19least-skilled group re°ects, not smaller percentage point movements in their unemployment
rate, just smaller movements relative to their much higher average unemployment. Their
lower cyclicality of ln(unemployment) partly re°ects the larger match-quality shocks they
face. By creating a greater dispersion in match quality, these shocks create greater rents to
employment matches. As a result, separations are less responsive to the cyclical movements in
aggregate productivity. The model generates roughly similar volatility in other dimensions
across the skill groups. Each shows similar cyclical °uctuations in the ¯nding rate that
move nearly perfectly opposite the unemployment rate. The prediction that workers with
higher assets, and higher reservation matches, sort into unemployment during recessions is
strongest for the middle skill group; but it is strong for three. The most striking di®erence
in the model predictions by skill, besides the relative volatilities of employment, is that
we predict a much stronger Beveridge curve for the least-skilled group, with vacancies and
unemployment correlated ¡0:49, than for the higher skill groups. This re°ects the predictions
that the ln(separation rate) is least volatile for the least-skilled group, while the ln(vacancy
rate) is most volatile for this group.
When the groups are aggregated, Column 4, the low-skill group contributes a dispropor-
tionate weight to the volatility of unemployment, as their average unemployment share is
nearly equal to that of the other two groups combined. As a result, the aggregated model
economy shows less unemployment volatility than does the benchmark one-skill economy.
The model economy generates a standard deviation of log(unemployment) that is 8:6 times
that of productivity. Recall that Shimer(2005a) reports a ratio of 9.5 for the U.S. data. (As
with Table 2, select data statistics from Shimer appear in the last column of Table 3.) The
model economy generates a higher standard deviation for separations and lower standard
deviation of the ¯nding rate than Shimer reports. However, given the lower correlation of
separations with unemployment for the model, the implied projections of the separation and
¯nding rates on the unemployment rate are fairly close to those for the data. As discussed
in connection to Table 2, the biggest shortcoming of our model is its failure to predict va-
cancies that are as volatile or as cyclical as have been estimated in the data. When the
skill groups are aggregated, the model produces a standard deviation for vacancies one-third
that reported by Shimer. There is a stronger negative correlation of vacancies with the un-
employment rate now, ¡0:33, than with the benchmark single-skill economy, re°ecting the
20disproportionate weighting of the less-skilled workers; but its magnitude falls short of the
negative correlation reported by Shimer (¡0:89).
Lastly we take the model simulations and generate a panel of individual wages, as-
set, and separation outcomes. We anticipate cyclicality in wages and separations to di®er
by worker labor supply (reservation match quality){workers with higher reservation match
quality should exhibit less cyclical wages, but more cyclical separations. The arti¯cial data
panel allows us to estimate regressions of wages and separations on the unemployment rate
interacted with the worker's reservation match quality or the characteristics, human capital
and assets, that determine reservation match quality. We do so in anticipation of reporting
comparable regressions on the SIPP data in Section 5. The simulated data pools the three
skill groups. For each skill level 2000 worker histories of 360 months each is constructed.
Table 4, Column 1, reports the results of regressing a worker's log real wage on the unem-
ployment rate in percentage points. Estimation allows for an individual worker ¯xed-e®ect.
The wage, not surprisingly, is markedly procyclical, with a one percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate associated with a drop in real wage of 1:4 percent. More relevant
to our model, Column 2 adds an interaction of the unemployment rate with the worker's
reservation match quality. The interaction e®ect is clearly signi¯cantly positively{higher
x¤ predicts a smaller negative wage response to the unemployment rate. The magnitude
of this e®ect on wages is not so large. The standard deviation of the reservation match
quality, x¤, in the arti¯cial panel is about 1:5 percent. So increasing x¤ by this standard
deviation reduces the predicted wage drop in response to a percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate from 1:4 percent to 1:3 percent. The third column of Table 4 interacts
the unemployment rate with the worker's human capital, ln(h), and current assets relative
to human capital, ln(a=h). These are the factors that dictate a worker's reservation match
quality. As anticipated, higher skill is associated with more cyclical wages, while higher
assets are associated with wages that are less cyclical.
Columns 4 to 6 of the table conduct the same exercise but for the separation rate, entering
as a zero/one dummy, as the dependent variable. Separations are countercyclical. A one
percentage point increase in unemployment rate increases the rate of separations by 0.22
percentage points (Column 4). Mirroring the results for wages, separations are signi¯cantly
more cyclical for workers with lower labor supply, as captured by a higher reservation match
21quality (Column 5). This e®ect is fairly sizable: Increasing x¤ by its standard deviation
increases the magnitude of the e®ect of unemployment on separations by 50 percent. The
table's last column relates cyclicality in separations to a worker's human capital and assets.
Separations are particularly cyclical, increasing with the unemployment rate, for workers with
higher assets relative to long-term wage. For a given skill group, the standard deviation of
ln(a=h) is 54 percent; so the regression implies that a worker with asset position one standard
deviation above the mean would display a response of separations to the unemployment rate
of 0:36 percentage points instead of 0:21. The model generates less cyclicality in the level
of separations for workers with higher human capital. But this e®ect is small relative to
the impact of human capital on wage cyclicality and not statistically signi¯cant. The weak
association of skill with separations re°ects the greater shocks to match-speci¯c productivity
calibrated for the lowest skill group. Although the model predicts these workers display less
cyclical wages (Column 3), rents from match quality insulate lower-skilled workers somewhat
from separations in response to aggregate productivity shocks. The net e®ect is the weak
relationship between cyclicality of separation rates and human capital.
4. Cyclicality in Employment and Separations
4.1. SIPP Data
The SIPP is a longitudinal survey of adults in households designed to be representative of
the U.S. population. It consists of a series of overlapping longitudinal panels. Each panel
is about three years in duration, though this varies somewhat across panels. Each panel is
large, containing samples of about 20,000 households. Households are interviewed every four
months. At each interview, information on work experience (employers, hours, earnings) are
collected for the three preceding as well as most recent month. The ¯rst survey panel, the
1984 panel, was initiated in October 1983. Each year through 1993 a new panel was began.
New, slightly longer, panels were initiated in 1996 and again in 2001. In our analysis we
pool the 12 panels, with the exception of the panel for 1989, which is very short in duration.
Given the timing of panels, the number of households in our pooled sample will vary over
time, with a gap of zero observations during part of 2000.
For our purposes the SIPP has some distinct advantages. Compared to the CPS, its
22panel structure allows us to compare workers by long-term wages or hours. It has additional
information on income, assets, and employer turnover. Unlike the CPS, respondents who
change household addresses are followed. The SIPP has both a larger and more representative
sample than the PSID or NLS panels. Individuals are interviewed every four months, rather
than annually, so respondents' recall of hours, earnings, and employment turnover since the
prior interview should be considerably better. Information on income and assets is also
collected with greater frequency. For instance, information on assets is only collected about
every ¯ve years in the PSID. For most SIPP panels, lasting about three years, it is collected
twice.
We restrict our sample to individuals between the ages of 20 and 60. Individuals must
not be in the armed forces, not disabled, not be attending school full-time, and must have
remained in the survey for at least a year. We further restrict the analysis to those who
worked at least two separate months with reported hours and earnings during their interview
panel. Our resulting pooled sample consists of 153,322 separate individuals, representing
1,175,945 interviews, with data on employment status for 4,368,272 monthly observations.
Wage rates re°ect an hourly rate of pay on the main job. More than sixty percent report
a wage in this form. For the rest we construct an hourly rate from hours and earnings
information for that month based on how the hourly wage projects on these variables for
those reporting an hourly wage. The statistics on employment and wages do not re°ect self
employment.
We report statistics separately for men and women. Men and women show comparable
averages in age, 37.5, and years of schooling, just over 13. (All statistics re°ect SIPP cross-
sectional sampling weights that adjust for non-interviews.) Men's average wage is 25 percent
higher than women's (respectively $15.03 and $11.70 in December 2004 dollars); and their
average workweek is 16 percent higher (corresponding to 42.9 hours for men and 36.6 hours
for women).
4.2. Employment Cyclicality
Our ¯rst look at employment transitions is based on changes in a worker's monthly employ-
ment status. We classify a worker as employed if the worker reports having a job for the
entire month, no time searching or on layo®, and at most two weeks in the month not work-
23ing without pay. Note that it is possible such a worker changes employers during the month.
These transitions rates based on employment status gives us the broadest sample coverage.
Among those not employed, we distinguish two groups: those who say they searched during
the month and those who do not. We are careful here not to refer to transitions out of
employment as separations because, as demonstrated below, many exiting workers return
to the same employer. Similarly we do not refer to transitions into jobs as job ¯nding, as
these could be workers returning to an employer. We turn to separations based on employer
transitions directly below.
Results are reported separately for men and women in Table 5, Columns 1 and 3. 7.1 per-
cent of men are not employed; of these, two-thirds (4.7 percentage points) report searching.
For women the comparable numbers are 12.2 percent not employed, with about one-third
of these (3.8 percentage points) reporting searching. Average monthly transition rates out
of employment equal 1.7 percent for men and 2.3 percent for women. Rates of transition
from not employed to employed equal 23.4 percent for men and 17.1 percent for women.
These rates are somewhat lower than sometimes cited. But keep in mind that, especially for
women, these rates re°ect many persons who say they are not searching.
Cyclicality in the employment rates and transition rates are reported in Columns 2 and
4 of Table 5. The measure of cyclicality re°ects regressing the individual outcome (e.g., not
employed, searching) on the level of the national unemployment rate. In addition to the
unemployment rate, the regressors include linear and quadratic time trends and seasonal
dummies.12 Standard errors are corrected for clustering by monthly time period. For men
the percent that are not employed and searching responds almost one percentage point for
each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. For women the fraction reporting
searching is also very countercyclical, but only moves by 6 tenths of a percentage point for
each percentage point increase in unemployment. For both men and women the fraction
not working, not searching is nearly acyclical. Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005b), among
others, have noted that the transition rate from employment to non-employment (separation
12All regressions also include controls for an individual's years of schooling, age, age2, and marital status
and dummies for whether the observation is from panels 1984-1988, 1990-1993, or 1996/2001. The panel
dummies are included to capture any changes in methods across the SIPP panels. These changes are not very
important for the employment-based variables. They are more relevant for measures of employer turnover
analyzed below as methods for matching employer ID's were re¯ned for the later years of the SIPP.
24rate) is less cyclical than the rate from non-employment to employment (¯nding rate). Our
results very much reinforce this picture. For both men and women the transition rate from
employment to not employed increases only slightly, and not statistically signi¯cantly, with
the national unemployment rate. By contrast, the rate of transition from not employed to
employed is very procyclical, particularly for men. For men a one percentage point increase
in the unemployment rate decreases transitions to employment by 10 percent of its average
rate of 23 percentage points.13
Table 6 examines employment and transition rates by long-term wages, where long-term
wage is the average (ln)observed for the individual across all months employed.14 Men and
women are divided into three equal-sized groups with the lowest, middle, and highest long-
term wages. Looking at the ¯rst row of the table, for both men and women, workers in the
top third of wages earn about a 90 percent higher wage than those in the bottom third. The
lower-wage workers are much more likely to be out of employment. Comparing the bottom
third of the wage distribution to the top third, the rate of non-employment is three times
higher for the lower-wage workers among men and four times higher for lower-wage workers
among women. Most of the lower employment rate for lower wage workers can be accounted
for by their relatively high separation rates: for both men and women, workers in the bottom
third of wages exit employment at a rate twice that of workers in the middle third of wages,
and three times greater than those in the top third. By contrast, low and high-wage workers
di®er much less in their rates of transiting from non-employment to employment; for men
these di®erences are particularly small. The table also reports the ratio of family net wealth
to family income across the three groups. This ratio is somewhat higher for the higher-wage
workers, especially among men.
13We also estimated cyclicality of employment and transitions with the SIPP data aggregated and HP-
¯ltered. The cyclicality of the employment and transition rates are very similar to those reported in Table
5. This is not surprising as the HP-de¯ned trend in the unemployment rate for 1983-2003 projects almost
entirely on a linear and quadratic trend.
With these aggregated series we also examined non-contemporaneous correlations between unemployment
and transition rates out of employment. Fujita and Ramey (2006) ¯nd that employment separations measured
from CPS data are signi¯cantly negatively correlated with subsequent industrial production. For men in
the SIPP we also clearly see transitions from employment to non-employment that lead the cycle. The
correlation between a three-month average of the rate of employment exits and the unemployment rate a
year later is 0.4, though contemporaneously is only 0.1.
14Workers' relative wages are judged after removing the e®ects of dummy variables for the workers' panel
of observation separately. A worker's wage is also adjusted for the stage of business cycle that each wage is
observed.
25Table 7 presents the cyclicality of employment versus non-employment across the same
wage groups. Employment is considerably more cyclical for lower-wage workers. For men,
a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with an increase in
the non-employment rate of respectively 1.5, 0.9, and 0.6 percentage points respectively for
workers with low, medium, and high wages. For women the comparable numbers are 1.2,
0.4, and 0.2 percentage points. The second row of Table 7 expresses these percentage point
changes as a share of that wage-group's average employment rate. For men the low-wage
group exhibits percent °uctuations in employment that are one-and-half to two time greater
than for the middle-wage group, and three times that for the high-wage group. For women,
though employment °uctuations are smaller, these °uctuations are even more skewed toward
the low-wage workers.
This greater employment volatility for lower-wage workers does not, however, imply that
lower wage workers make up a bigger share of those not employed in recessions. This is
shown in the ¯nal row of Table 7, which expresses the percentage point response in non-
employment for each group as a share of its average out-of-employment rate. Comparing
the lowest wage group of men to the highest we see that, in percent terms, the fraction
unemployed actually responds more for the high-wage group to a percentage point increase
in the national unemployment rate (14.0 percent response compared to 12.6 percent). This
re°ects that, even though the response in percentage points unemployed is 2.7 times as large
for the low wage group (1.53 points versus 0.56), their average level of unemployment is three
times larger (12.2 points compared to 4.1). For men the middle wage group actually shows
the largest percent response in fraction not employed to the national unemployment rate
(17.7 percent). For women the percent response in fraction not employed is much smaller
than for men, with this response slightly higher for lower wage workers (4.3 percent) than
for middle (3.9 percent) and high-wage (4.1 percent). A good summary, both for men and
women, is that the percent response in fraction not-employed is roughly the same across all
wage groups.
4.3. Cyclicality in separations
We turn now to measures of employer separations that re°ect whether workers change em-
ployers. A major advantage of the SIPP for tracking turnover is that each job is associated
26with an employer ID. Our broadest measure of separation includes moves to a new employer
or to non-employment. In principle, this separation status could be determined monthly for
each worker. But workers are much more likely to report changes in employer ID across
interviews than across the four months covered within each interview. (This is referred to
as the SIPP seam e®ect; see Gottschalck and Nielson, 2006.). For this reason, we construct
trimester separation rates by comparing the employer for those employed at an interview to
the employer and employer status at the next interview four months later. If the worker has
the same employer at the subsequent interview with no period out of work between the inter-
views, we treat this as no separation. If the worker changes employer at the next interview
with no period out of work, we label this a job-to-job separation. If the worker experiences a
period out of work (de¯ned by positive weeks on layo® or searching, or three or more weeks
in a month with no pay), but returns to the same employer by the subsequent interview,
then we treat this as a temporary separation. The remaining separations are non-temporary
separations to unemployment. Note some of these workers report new employers at the next
interview; some do not.
The relative sizes for each transition group are reported for men and women in Columns
1 and 3 of Table 8. The trimester separation rate for men is 12.8 percent. But nearly half
of these, 6.2 percentage points, re°ect job-to-job changes. This ¯nding is consistent with
estimates in Nagypal (2005). The trimester rate of separations with exit from employment is
6.6 percent. Of these slightly over half, 3.5 percentage points, are temporary, with return to
the employer. So the trimester separation rate out of employment, without return the next
interview, is only 3.1 percent. For women the rates of separation out of employment, both
with and without return to the employer, are higher, together totalling 9.2 percent. This is
consistent with the higher rate of not employed for the sample of women.
Columns 2 and 4 display cyclicality in the separation rates. The measure of cyclicality
re°ects regressing the individual observation on the zero/one variable for turnover on the
level of the national unemployment rate. In addition to the unemployment rate, the regres-
sions again include trends and other controls as in Table 5. For men job-to-job separations
are clearly procyclical, a one percentage point increase in unemployment decreases job-to-
job separations by 0.51 percentage points, which is eight percent of its mean value of 6.2
percentage points. Temporary and other separations out of work are countercyclical; but
27this cyclicality is small and not statistically signi¯cant. For women the patterns are similar,
with job-to-job movements procyclical and other separations nearly acyclical. But the job-
to-job separations only respond by half as much to the unemployment rate as the response
for men. We also examined results splitting samples by employment in a cyclical industry,
where cyclical industries are manufacturing, construction, and transportation. Cyclicality in
separations are remarkably similar across the split, with job-to-job separations clearly pro-
cyclical and separations out of employment modestly countercyclical for men and acyclical
for women.
5. Cyclicality in Wages and Separations across Work-
ers
Our model predicts that workers with higher desired labor supply will exhibit more cyclical
wages and thereby less cyclical separations. We compare these predictions here to ¯ndings
across workers in the SIPP data. We ¯rst stratify workers based on how much they work
during their approximately three years in the SIPP panel. We also examine how cyclicality
di®ers across workers based on their long-term wages and a measure of their asset position.
5.1. Wage cyclicality
Table 9 examines the response of individual hourly wages to the unemployment rate. Only
survey month observations on real wages are included. To control for heterogeneity, we es-
timate allowing for individual ¯xed e®ects. With ¯xed e®ects, cyclicality is measured by
the monthly unemployment rate relative to the average for that individual over the approx-
imately three years the person is sampled. We also allow for seasonals and an individual's
age and age squared as regressors. Standard errors are corrected for clustering by monthly
time period.
For both men and women real wages are procyclical, but only modestly. For men, from
the ¯rst column, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rates is associated
with real wages reduced by 0.5 percent, for women, Column 4, by only 0.3 percent. This
fairly weak cyclicality hides the fact that real wages are sharply procyclical for new hires.
Columns 2 and 5 of the table presents results only for those workers who were hired at
28that employer within the last year. (Workers returning to an employer are not treated as
new hires.) For new hires wages are much more cyclical. For men a one percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 1.8 percent lower wage; for women it is
associated with a 1.2 percent lower wage. For both men and women this impact is estimated
fairly precisely, with standard error of about 0.2 percentage points. By contrast Columns
3 and 6 report that, for workers not identi¯ed as new hires, the wage is not cyclical.15 For
men the modest e®ect of a percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, a fall of 0.3
percent in the wage, is only marginally signi¯cant; for women it is insigni¯cant. The ¯nding
of greater wage cyclicality for new hires is consistent with earlier ¯ndings from other data
sets by Bils (1985) and Beaudry and DiNardo (1991). Models incorporating wage rigidity
into cyclical matching models (e.g., Hall, 2005) stress the wage setting of new hires, as the
discounted value of wages is central to the value of vacancy creation. But we ¯nd wages of
new hires are very cyclical.
We next ask if the cyclicality in wages di®ers for workers by their longer-run labor sup-
plied. We do so because our model predicts workers with high desired labor supply (low
reservation match quality) should exhibit more cyclical wages and less cyclical separations.
For each worker we sum the fraction of weeks worked during their panel of observations and
the average log of hours worked when employed. For any monthly observation we eliminate
the six months surrounding that month. That is for month t, the ¯xed e®ects in labor
excludes the two months prior to t, t, and the three months after t. To put variations in
fraction of weeks worked in percent terms, we divide the individual's value by the mean for
their sample.16
Panel A of Table 10, Columns 1 and 3, interact the cyclical measure, unemployment
rate, with a worker's ¯xed e®ect in labor supplied. Results are shown separately for new
hires and other workers. Workers who typically work more show much more cyclical wages.
This is true both for new hires and other workers. The standard deviation in this measure
of long-run labor supplied is 0.22 for men (re°ecting 0.12 in fraction of weeks worked and
15The groups identi¯ed as other workers (Columns 3 and 6) may include workers who joined the employer
at a date 4 to 11 months prior, if that date is prior to the worker joining the data panel.
16Usual hours includes any on a second job. The average is taken over months with usual hours of at least
15. Workers' relative hours and weeks worked are judged after removing the e®ects of dummy variables for
the workers' panel of observation. We also adjust for the stage of business cycle of the observation.
290.17 from hours per week) and 0.33 for women (re°ecting 0.17 in fraction of weeks worked
and 0.25 from hours per week). Multiplying by the estimated coe±cients from Columns 2
and 4 shows that a one-standard deviation increase in hours worked implies that, among
workers who are not new hires, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate
is associated with a wage decline that is 0.36 percentage points larger for men and 0.28
percentage points larger for women. Among new hires, Columns 1 and 3, wages are even
more strikingly cyclical for those who work more, especially among women.
Our model relates cyclicality of a worker's reservation wage to that worker's asset position.
Workers with lower assets, relative to their long-term earnings, are predicted to show more
cyclical wages and less cyclical separations. We examine these predictions in Panel B of
Table 10. As discussed above, asset information is not collected for most interviews. In
some SIPP panels it was collected twice, or even more, in some only once, and for the 1988
panel not at all. We stratify workers based on the amount of net worth and unsecured debt
they report. (We average the responses for panels with asset information from more than
one interview.) We de¯ne a worker as a low-asset worker if either (a) they have non-positive
net worth or (b) they have unsecured debt greater than 1000 hours of earnings based on
their average wage. About one-sixth of the male sample and one-¯fth of female sample fall
under this category.
Wages are more cyclical for workers with lower assets. The table again reports results
separately for those hired within the last twelve months versus other workers. Wage are
much more cyclical for new hires with relatively low assets; this is true for men and women.
Consider two new hires with comparable long-term wage, but only one with low assets. The
regression implies that, among men, the man with low assets will show a decline in real wage
that is 0.78 percentage points larger for a percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate. Among female new hires the di®erential is similar, equaling 0.68 percentage points.
These results are robust to lower-wage workers having di®erent wage cyclicality, as they
control for the worker's wage level as well as age. This ¯nding is also robust to controlling
for interactions of the business cycle with the worker's hours or schooling. For workers that
are not new hires the e®ects of assets on wage cyclicality is qualitatively similar, but weaker.
Among men greater cyclicality of wages for workers with low assets is statistically clear; but
the estimated interaction with wage cyclicality is only seventy percent as large its estimate
30among new hires. For women, excluding workers hired in the past year, the interaction of
having low assets is smaller in magnitude and not statistically signi¯cant. We examined
results separating workers employed in the private sector from those in the government or
non-pro¯t sector. We base this split on the presumption that the government sector may
be less able to exhibit wages that respond in a rich manner cyclically. The greater wage
cyclical for low-asset workers, especially among men, is driven by the behavior of wages in
the private sector.
Our calibrated model predicts high-skilled workers display greater wage cyclicality{high
skilled workers have higher labor supply (lower reservation match quality), and so greater
aversion to long unemployment spells in recessions. But, from Panel B of Table 10, for women
we see that wages are less cyclical for higher-wage workers. The standard deviation in long-
term wage is about 0.40 for both men and women. The estimates imply that increasing
long-term wage by this standard deviation reduces the absolute response of the wage to the
unemployment rate by 0.26 percentage points for women. (This estimated e®ect of wage level
on wage cyclicality is of the same magnitude for new hires and other female workers, but
only statistically signi¯cant for the larger group that are not new hires.) Men with higher
long-term wages also show less wage cyclicality. But this di®erential is considerably smaller
across male workers and not statistically signi¯cant. The concluding section discusses how
one might alter the calibrated model to eliminate the prediction that higher-wage workers
show more cyclical wages.17
5.2. Cyclicality in Separations
We last examine how cyclicality in separations di®ers across workers by labor supplied and
by assets and long-term wage. We focus on separations out of employment, both those with
and without return to the employer. In each case the dependent variable take on value of
zero (e.g., no temporary separation) or one (yes, a temporary separation).
17Castro and Coen-Pirani (2007) ¯nd, using CPS data, that for last twenty years wages and employment
have been comparably cyclical for workers of di®ering years of schooling. This is in contrast to earlier years,
where the CPS shows less cyclicality in wages and employment for workers with more schooling. Their
results are not inconsistent with our results that higher wage workers show less cyclical wages and (below)
less cyclical separations. If we project wage and employment cyclicality just on years of schooling, ignoring
other variations in longer term wages, we see similar cyclical °uctuation in wages and separations across
schooling groups.
31Panel A of Table 11 shows the e®ect of interacting the unemployment rate with the
worker's long-term labor supplied. From Columns 1 and 3 we see that, for both men and
women, workers who typically work more are much less likely to exhibit temporary separa-
tions when unemployment is high. Increasing labor by one standard deviation (0.22 for men
and 0.33 for women) decreases the response of these separations to the unemployment rate
by more than 0.5 percentage points for men and by 0.8 percentage points for women. These
di®erences are large as well as statistically signi¯cant.18 Workers who work longer hours,
both for men and for women, are also less likely to exhibit non-temporary separations out of
employment during recessions (Columns 2 and 4). We view these results as very supportive
of the central tenet of our model{that workers with higher desired labor supply will separate
less during recessions.19
We see that in recessions separations shift toward workers who work less, especially for
men. We ask if this creates important cyclical compositional shifts in worker labor supply.
More exactly, does the average worker ¯xed e®ect in labor supply conditional on being em-
ployed respond to the unemployment rate? Does the average ¯xed e®ect in labor supply
conditional on not being employed respond to the unemployment rate? For answers, we
construct by month the mean ¯xed e®ect in labor for those employed and for those not em-
ployed.20 The top panel of Figure 4 plots a three-month moving average for the compositional
e®ect in this labor supply for employed men versus a three-month moving average for the
unemployment rate. (The composition e®ect is ¯rst HP-¯ltered and seasonally adjusted, par-
alleling treatment of the unemployment rate.) Consistent with separations shifting toward
lower labor supply workers, the workforce shows a shift during recessions toward workers
who typically work more. A percentage point increase in unemployment is associated with
a 0.22 percent increase in the average labor ¯xed-e®ect for the workforce (with Newey-West
18Recall that, in determining separations in any month, the worker's weeks worked and hours in that,
the two preceding, and three following months, do not enter into the measure of long-term labor supply.
Since temporary separations are those who return at least by the interview four months later, the period of
temporary separation is not re°ected in the measure of long-term labor supplied.
19We focus on separations out of employment, as job-to-job separations are not readily related to our
model. We can point out, however, that job-to-job separations display a shift toward workers with higher
labor supply and workers with higher wages with increases in the unemployment rate.
20The compositional e®ects in labor supply for the employed group and for the unemployed group is
calculated by subtracting the mean ¯xed e®ect for all persons from the mean for that subgroup. So any
shifts overtime in the labor ¯xed e®ect for the overall SIPP data are di®erenced away.
32robust standard error of 0.02).21 There is a much larger cyclical compositional e®ect in la-
bor supply among those not employed. This is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 4.
Among men not employed, a one-percentage point increase in unemployment is associated
with a large drop of 1.59 percent in the group's average labor ¯xed-e®ect (standard error
0.32 percent). For women these cyclical composition e®ects are in the same direction, but
considerably smaller and not statistically signi¯cant.
For our model the sorting of workers with lower labor supply, re°ecting higher reservation
match values, into unemployment discourages vacancy creation during recessions. The strong
compositional shift among unemployed men shown in Figure 4 supports this. A related
question, more directly related to the value of vacancy creation, is what happens cyclically
to the ¯xed e®ect in labor for the set of workers who transit from unemployed to employed.
The compositional e®ect for these workers behaves very similarly to that for the unemployed
pool{a percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is accompanied by a large drop
of 1.61 percent in the group's average labor ¯xed e®ect (with standard error 0.35 percent).
Panel B of Table 11 examines how cyclicality in separations projects on a worker's asset
position. As predicted by the model, for both men and women permanent separations are
lower in recessions for workers with low assets. The estimated magnitude of this e®ect is
economically important; but it is not statistically quite signi¯cant. By contrast, temporary
separations, with return to the employer, are more cyclical for those workers with greater
assets. But this e®ect is also only marginally statistically signi¯cant.
The regressions in Panel B also relate cyclicality in separations to the worker's relative
long-term wage. For men cyclicality of separations from employment are nearly unrelated
to the long-term wage; but behind this we see that during recessions lower-wage workers
exhibit an increase in temporary separations, whereas higher-wage worker exhibit an increase
in permanent separations. For women both types of separations shift toward higher-wage
21Our ¯nding that the workforce shifts toward workers who typically work more hours in a recession
parallels the ¯nding from a number of papers that during recessions the workforce shifts toward workers
who average higher wages (e.g., Barsky, Parker, and Solon, 1994). For workers in the SIPP data, a one-
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.10 percent drop (standard error
of 0.02 percent) in the wage ¯xed-e®ect of the employed workforce. Note that this compositional e®ect is
less than half the magnitude that we see in the ¯xed e®ect in labor supply. It is smaller than the cyclical
compositional e®ect in wages estimated by Barsky, Parker and Solon; but this di®erence is falls in line with
Castro and Coen-Pirani (2007) evidence that business cycle are much less focused on lower wage workers in
the last twenty year.
33women during recessions, but this is particular true for the permanent separations.
6. Conclusions
We introduced worker heterogeneity in worker skills and assets into a model of separations,
matching, and unemployment over the business cycle. We have focused on heterogeneity
associated with a worker's labor supply because it yields sharp, rich, testable predictions for
a model with °exible wages. Most notably, it predicts that workers with high labor supply,
those with low assets to earnings and therefore low reservation wages, will avoid separating in
recessions when unemployment duration is long. In turn this predicts these workers will show
greater cyclicality of wages, but less (counter)cyclical separations. When separations shift
toward workers with high reservation wages in downturns, because these workers yield lower
rents to employers, this acts to discourage creating vacancies, exacerbating the cyclicality of
unemployment.
We examine employment separations and wage cyclicality over the past twenty years
for workers in the SIPP data. Workers who typically work longer hours do display much
greater cyclicality of wages and less cyclicality of separations. We also ¯nd that workers
with low assets or high debts show more cyclical wages and less cyclical separations into
unemployment, though the latter e®ect is not so empirically signi¯cant.
We conclude that heterogeneity, particularly sorting by unemployment tolerance, may
help to explain why unemployment durations are so cyclical. A related conclusion is that,
in one way, wage °exibility exacerbates cyclical volatility{it is through °exible wage setting
that workers with tolerance for unemployment sort into that pool during recessions.
One shortcoming of our calibrated business-cycle model is that it fails to predict the
smaller wage cyclicality we see for higher-wage workers. Related, it under predicts the cycli-
cality we see in separations to unemployment for higher-wage workers, especially comparing
across female workers. One way to modify the model to capture these patterns would be
to reduce the relative labor supply of higher-wage workers (increase their reservation match
qualities). In turn this could be generated by increasing the relative unemployment income
of higher-skilled workers (a replacement rate more proportional to human capital) or by
increasing the coe±cient of relative risk aversion above one. Both of these modi¯cations can
34be empirically justi¯ed. But, for our model to still generate the much higher unemployment
rate observed for low-wage workers, this would require that lower-wage workers face much
higher job destruction rates and shocks to match quality. We see it as more promising to
pursue models where the comparative advantage in the market for higher-wage workers is
partly manifested through greater search intensity in recessions. We believe this can poten-
tially explain why higher wage workers show much higher job-to-job separations, but fewer
temporary separations, during recessions.
35References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron and Robert Shimer, 1999, \E±cient Unemployment Insurance," Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 107, 893-928.
[2] Anderson, Patricia M. and Bruce D. Meyer, 1997, \Unemployment Insurance Takeup
Rates and the After-Tax Value of Bene¯ts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 913-
937.
[3] Aiyagari, R. S., 1994, \Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Savings," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 109(3), 659-683.
[4] Baker, 1992, \Unemployment Duration: Compositional E®ects and Cyclical Variabil-
ity," American Economic Review, 82(1), 313-21.
[5] Barsky, Robert, Gary Solon and Jonathan A. Parker., 1994, \Measuring The Cycli-
cality Of Real Wages: How Important Is Composition Bias?," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 109(1), 1-25.
[6] Beaudry, Paul and John DiNardo, 1991, \The E®ect of Implicit Contracts on the Move-
ment of Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro Data," Journal of Political
Economy, 99(4), 665-88.
[7] Bils, Mark J. 1985, \Real Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Panel Data,"
Journal of Political Economy, 93(4), 666-89.
[8] Castro, Rui and Daniele Coen-Pirani, 2007, \Why Have Aggregate Skilled Hours Be-
come So Cyclical Since the Mid-1980's?," International Economic Review, Forthcoming.
[9] Chang, Yongsung, and Sun-Bin Kim, 2006, \From Individual to Aggregate Labor Sup-
ply: A Quantitative Analysis Based on a Heterogeneous Agent Macroeconomy," Inter-
national Economic Review, 47(1), 1-27.
[10] Chang, Yongsung, and Sun-Bin Kim, 2007, \Heterogeneity and Aggregation: Implica-
tions for Labor-Market Fluctuations," American Economic Review, forthcoming.
36[11] Coles, Melvyn, and Randall Wright, 1998, \A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search,
Bargaining, and Money," Journal of Economic Theory, 78(1), 32-54.
[12] Costain, James S. and Michael Reiter, 2003, \Business Cycles, Unemployment Insur-
ance, and the Calibration of Matching Models," Economics Working Papers 872, De-
partment of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[13] Darby, Michael R., John C. Haltiwanger and Mark W. Plant, 1985, \Unemployment
Rate Dynamics and Persistent Unemployment under Rational Expectations," American
Economic Review, 75(4), 614-37.
[14] Den Haan,Wouter J., Garey Ramey and Joel Watson, 2000, \Job Destruction and the
Experiences of Displaced Workers," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy, 52(1), 129-136.
[15] Fisher, Jonas, 2006, \The Dynamic E®ects of Neutral and Investment-Speci¯c Technol-
ogy Shocks," Journal of Political Economy, 114(3). 413-51.
[16] Fujita, Shigeru and Garey Ramey, 2006, \The cyclicality of job loss and hiring," Working
Papers 06-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
[17] Gertler, M., and Trigari, A., 2006, \Unemployment Fluctuations With Staggered Nash
Wage Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 12498.
[18] Gomes, Joao, Jeremy Greenwood, and Sergio Rebelo, 2001, \Equilibrium Unemploy-
ment," Journal of Monetary Economics, 48, 109-152.
[19] Gottschalck, Alfred O. and Robert B. Nielsen, 2006, \The presence of the seam in SIPP
panels: E®ects on labor force estimates," Eastern Economic Association. Philadelphia,
PA.
[20] Haefke, Christian, Marcus Sonntag, and Thijs van RensIourii Manovskii, 2007, \Wage
Rigidity and Job Creation," manuscript, Universitat Pampeu Fabra.
[21] Hagedorn, Marcus and Iourii Manovskii, 2005, \The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium
Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited," manuscript.
37[22] Hall, Robert E., 1980, \Employment Fluctuations and Wage Rigidity," Brookings Papers
on Economics Activity, (1), 93-123.
[23] Hall, Robert E., 2005a, \Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness,"
American Economic Review, 95(1), 50-65.
[24] Hall, Robert E., 2005b , \Job Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment in the U.S. over
the Past Fifty Years," Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogo® ed. NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, No. 20, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
[25] Hall, Robert E., 2006, \Work-Consumption Preferences, Cyclical Driving Forces, and
Unemployment Volatility," manuscript, Stanford University.
[26] Krusell, Per, and Anthony Smith, 1998, \Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the
Macroeconomy," Journal of Political Economy, 106, 867-896.
[27] Kudyak, Marianna, 2006, \Wage Smoothing and the Cyclical User Cost of Labor,"
manuscript, University of Rochester.
[28] Kydland, Finn, 1984, \Labor-force heterogeneity and the business cycle," Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 21, 173-208.
[29] Meyer, Bruce D., 1990, \Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells," Econo-
metrica, 58, 757-782.
[30] Mortensen, D., and Pissarides, C., 1994, \Job Creation and Destruction in the Theory
of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, 61(3), 397-415.
[31] Mortensen, D. and Eva Nagypal, 2005, \More on Unemployment and Vacancy Fluctu-
ations," IZA Discussion Paper 1765.
[32] Nagypal, E., 2005, \Worker Reallocation over the Business Cycles: The Importance of
Job-to-Job Transitions," manuscript.
[33] Nakajima, Makoto, 2007, \Business Cycles in the Equilibrium Model of Labor Search
and Self-Insurance," manuscript.
38[34] Pissarides, C., 1987, \Search, Wage Bargains and Cycle" Review of Economic Studies,
54, 473-483.
[35] Pries, Michael J., 2006, \Worker Heterogeneity and Labor Market Volatility in Matching
Models" Review of Economic Dynamics, forthcoming.
[36] R¶ ³os-Rull, J.-V., 1999, \Computation of Equilibria in Heterogeneous-Agents Models,"
R. Marimon and A. Scott, eds., Computational Methods for the Study of Dynamic
Economies, New York: Oxford University Press.
[37] Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982, \Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica,
50(1), 97-110.
[38] Shao, Enchuan and Pedro Silos, 2007, \Individual Risk and the Cyclical Behavior of
Unemployment and Vacancies," Working Paper 2007-5, Federal Reserve Bank of At-
lanta.
[39] Shimer, R., 2004, \The Consequences of Rigid Wages in Search Models," Journal of the
European Ecomic Association (Papers and Proceedings), 2, 469-479.
[40] Shimer, R., 2005a, \The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacan-
cies," American Economic Review, 95(1), 25-49.
[41] Shimer, R., 2005b, \Reassessing the Inns and Outs of Unemployment," manuscript,
University of Chicago.
[42] Sider, H., 1985, \Unemployment Duration and Incidence: 1968-1982," American Eco-
nomic Review, 75, 461-72.
[43] Tauchen, G.,\Finite State Markov-Chain Approximations to Univariate and Vector Au-
toregressions," Economics Letters, 20 (1986), 177-181.
39A. Computational Algorithm
A.1. Steady-State Equilibrium
In steady state, the aggregate productivity z is constant at its mean and the measures of
workers ¹ and Ã are invariant over time. Computing the steady-state equilibrium amounts
to ¯nding i) the value functions W(a;x), U(a) and J(a;x), ii) the decision rules a0
e(a;x),
a0
u(a) and x¤(a), iii) the wage schedule w(a;x), iv) the labor market tightness µ, v) the
time-invariant measures ¹(a;x) and Ã(a) that satisfy the equilibrium conditions given in
subsection 2.4. The detailed computational algorithm for steady state equilibrium is as
follows.
1. Discretize the state space A £ X over which the value functions and wages are com-
puted. The stochastic process for the idiosyncratic productivity is approximated by
the ¯rst-order Markov process of which transition probability matrix is computed using
Tauchen's (1986) algorithm.
2. Assume an initial value of µ0.
3. Given µ0, we solve the Nash bargaining and individual optimization problems to ap-
proximate wages, value functions, and decision rules in the steady state, which will be
used to compute the time-invariant measures.
(a) Assume an initial wage schedule w0(a;x;µ0) for each (a;x) node.
(b) Given w0(a;x;µ0), solve for the worker's value functions, W(a;x;w0) and U(a;w0),
using equations (1) and (2) in the text. The value functions are approximated us-
ing the iterative method. The utility maximization problems in the worker's value
functions are solved through the Brent method. The decision rules a0
e(a;x;w0),
a0
u(a;w0) and x¤(a;w0) are obtained at each iteration of the value functions.
(c) Compute wages that satisfy the de¯nition of J(a;x;w0) in (3) and the Nash
bargaining solution in (5) in the text. Speci¯cally, we solve for w1(a;x;µ0) for
each (a;x) node that satis¯es
w
1(a;x;µ
0) = zxh ¡ J(a;x;w









40where J(a;x;w0) is computed using the ¯rst order condition for the Nash bar-














(d) If w1(a;x;µ0) and w0(a;x;µ0) are close enough to each other, then move on to
the step 4 to compute invariant measures and the corresponding labor market






0) + (1 ¡ ³w)w
0(a;x;µ
0):
4. Using the converged decision rules a0
e(a;x;w0), a0
u(a;w0) and x¤(a;w0) given the con-
verged wage schedule w0(a;x;µ0) from the step 3b and 3a, compute the time-invariant
measures ¹(a;x;µ0) and Ã(a;µ0) by iterating the laws of motion for measures given in
(6) and (7). Then, compute the labor market tightness µ1 that satis¯es the free-entry











5. If µ1 and µ0 are close enough to each other, then we found the steady state. Otherwise,
go back to the step 3 with a new guess for the labor market tightness:
µ
0 = ³µµ
1 + (1 ¡ ³µ)µ
0:
A.2. Equilibrium with Aggregate Fluctuations
Approximating the equilibrium in the presence of aggregate °uctuations requires us to include
the aggregate productivity, z, and the measures of workers, ¹ and Ã, as state variables for
agents' optimization problems. In order to make match separation decisions at the end of
a period, agents need to know their matching probabilities in the next period, p(µt+1) and
q(µt+1), which in turn depends on the next period's measures of workers, ¹t+1(a;x) and
Ãt+1(a). The laws of motion for the measures are given in equations (6) and (7). It is
impossible to keep track of the evolution of these measures. We employ Krusell-Smith's
(1998) \Bounded Rationality" method which approximates the distribution of workers by a
41number of its moments. We assume that agents in the economy make use of two ¯rst moments





and the number of employed workers, E =
R
d¹(a;x). Let ^ s denote a vector of aggregate
state variables in the approximation of equilibrium with °uctuations. Then ^ s = (K;E;z).
In addition we assume that the agents use log-linear rules in predicting the current µ, the
future K and the future E.
1. Guess a set of prediction rules for the equilibrium labor market tightness (µ) in the
current period, the average asset of the economy (K0) and the number of employed






µ;1 logK + b
0








K;1 logK + b
0








E;1 logK + b
0
E;2 logE + b
0
E;3 logz:
As is the case in the steady state computation, we approximate the stochastic process
for the aggregate productivity by the ¯rst-order Markov process of which transition
probability matrix is computed using Tauchen's (1986) algorithm.
2. Given these prediction rules, we solve the individual optimization and wage bargaining
problems. This step is analogous to step 3 in the steady state computation, so we omit
the detailed description of computational procedure. However, the dimension of state
variables is now much larger: (a;x;^ s). Computation of the conditional expectations
involves the evaluation of the value functions not on the grid points along K and E
dimensions since K0 and E0 are predicted by the log-linear rule above. We polynomially
interpolate the value functions along the K dimension when necessary.
3. We generate a set of arti¯cial time series data fµt;Kt;Etg of the length of 9,000 pe-
riods. Each period, these aggregate variables are calculated by summing up 50,000
workers' decisions on asset accumulation and match separation, which are simulated
using the converged value functions, W(a;x;^ s), U(a;^ s), and J(a;x;^ s), the decision
rules, a0
e(a;x;^ s), a0
u(a;^ s) and x¤(a;^ s) from the step 2, and the assumed prediction rules
for µ, K0 and E0 from the step 1.
424. We obtain the new values for the coe±cients (b1's) in the prediction functions through
the OLS using the simulated data from the step 3. If b0 and b1 are close enough to
each other, then we ¯nd the (limited information) rational expectations equilibrium
with aggregate °uctuations. Otherwise, go back to the step 1 with a new guesses for





i;j + (1 ¡ ³b)b
0
i;j;
where i = µ;K;E and j = 0;¢¢¢ ;3.
The converged prediction rules and their accuracy, measured by R2, for the benchmark
calibration with h = 1 are as follows.
² Prediction for labor market thightness in the current period:
logµ = 1:9055 ¡ 0:5176logK + 6:8826logE + 5:6884logz; R
2 = 0:9678
² Prediction for average aset holdings in the next period:
logK
0 = 0:0030 + 0:9999logK + 0:0251logE + 0:0438logz; R
2 = 0:9999
² Prediction for number of emloyed workers in the next period:
logE
0 = 0:0120 ¡ 0:0071logK + 0:8652logE + 0:0768logz; R
2 = 0:9517
Overall, the estimated prediction rules are fairly precise as R2's are close to 1, while the
prediction rule for average asset holdings provides the highest accuracy.




h = 1  Level of Human Capital 
α = 0.5  Matching technology m(v, u) = .313 v
αu
1-α 
γ = 1  Relative risk aversion 
θ = 1  Steady state v/u ratio (normalized) 
β = 0.99481  Discount factor 
Β = 0.659  Utility from leisure 
b  = 0.25  Unemployment benefit b = b h
0.75 
κ  = 0.073  Vacancy posting cost κ = κ h
0.5
λ = 0.01  Exogenous separation rate 
ρx = 0.97  Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity ln x 
σx = 0.58%  Standard deviation of innovation to ln x 
ρz = 0.95  Persistence of aggregate productivity shock ln z 
σz = 0.37%  Standard deviation of innovation to ln z 
a = -6.0  Borrowing constraint 
  
 Table 2: Model Comparisons for One-Skill Economy 
 
Models  Constant Separations  Endog. Separations  Exog. Separations  U.S. Data 
  λ = 2%  λ = 1%  λ = λt  
  σx = 0  σx = 0.58%  σx = 0   
  κ = 0.0736  κ = 0.0730  κ = 0.0736   
  β = 0.99472  β = 0.99481  β = 0.99472   
Steady State         
u  6.0% 6.0%  6.0%   
s  2.0% 2.0%  2.0%   
f  31.3% 31.3%  31.3%   
w  0.994 1.002  0.994   
a  17.4 17.3  17.4  
SD[a]  4.99 5.92  4.99  
        
Fluctuations        
SD(û)  3.7% 10.5%  8.5%  9.5% 
SD( )  v ˆ 6.4% 3.9%  7.3%  10.1% 
SD( )  s ˆ 0 11.2%  11.3%  3.8% 
SD( )  f ˆ 4.3% 5.6%  4.4%  5.9% 
SD ( [][] e u a a Ε Ε )  0.7% 1.6%  0.8%   
cor (û,  )  v ˆ -0.61 -0.16  0.28  -0.89 
cor (û, ŝ)  0 0.32  0.30  0.71 
cor (û,  )  f ˆ -0.85 -0.99  -0.71  -0.95 
cor(û, [][] e u a a Ε Ε )  -0.48 0.77  0.06   
 
A variable with circumflex denotes logged value: = ln x.  Statistics for fluctuations, standard deviations (SD) and correlations (cor), reflect H-P 
filtered series with smoothing parameter of 9 x 10
5.  Standard deviation of H-P filtered simulated productivity is 1%.  The discount factor (β) is 
chosen to obtain assets near 18; and the vacancy cost (κ) is chosen to yield a v-u ratio of 1.  U.S. statistics are based on Shimer (2006), with 
standard deviations relative to productivity’s.  
x ˆTable 3: Model Comparisons with Multiple Skill Groups 
 
  Lowest Skill  Middle Skill  Highest Skill  Aggregate  U.S. Data 
  h = 0.75  h = 1.0  h = 1.333    
  λ = 1.8%  λ = 1%  λ = 0.9%    
  σx = 0.98%  σx = 0.58%  σx = 0.58%    
  β = 0.99464  β = 0.99481  β = 0.99486    
Steady  State       
u  10.2% 6% 4.8%  7.1%   
s  3.30% 2% 1.85%  2.37%   
f  28.7% 31.3% 36.4% 31.2%   
w  0.75 1.002 1.34 1.04   
A  12.9 17.3 23.1 17.8   
SD[a]  5.2 5.9 7.2 7.5   
       
Fluctuations       
SD(û)  8.0% 10.5% 9.3% 8.6% 9.5% 
SD( )  v ˆ 4.2% 3.9% 2.8% 3.2%  10.1% 
SD( )  e ˆ 1.0% 0.8% 0.5% 0.7%   
SD( )  s ˆ 7.7% 11.2%  9.9% 8.8% 3.8% 
SD( )  f ˆ 5.1% 5.6% 4.7% 4.9% 5.9% 
cor(û,  )  v ˆ -0.49 -0.16 0.05 -0.33  -.0.89 
cor(û,  )  s ˆ 0.36 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.71 
cor(û,  )  f ˆ -0.97 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 -0.95 
cor(û, [][] e u a a Ε Ε )  0.72 0.77 0.63 0.78   
       
 
A variable with circumflex denotes logged value: = ln x.  Statistics for fluctuations, standard deviations (SD) and correlations (cor), reflect H-P 
filtered series with smoothing parameter of 9 x 10
5.  Standard deviation of H-P filtered simulated productivity is 1%.  U.S. statistics are based on 
Shimer (2006), with standard deviations relative to productivity’s.  
x ˆTable 4: Model Predictions for Cyclicality of Wages and Separations 
 
 
 Dependent  Variable 
 




























   7.17 
(1.10) 
 
UR * Ln(Human Capital) 
 
 
   ─0.53 
(0.05) 
   ─0.95 
(0.07) 
UR * Ln(Assets/Human Capital) 
 
 
   0.14 
(0.02) 
   0.27 
(0.04) 
        
 
The simulated panel consists of 2,160,000 observations (6,000 workers for 360 months each).  Estimation of wage cyclicality in first three 
columns allows for individual fixed effects.  Estimation of cyclicality in separations controls for a worker’s human capital and assets as well as the 









































8.4%  ─0.05 
(.05) 
Monthly rate from working 










Monthly rate from not 
















Regressions (columns 2 and 4) control for years of schooling, marital status, age, age
2, individual fixed effect in wage, monthly seasonals, linear 
and quadratic time trends, and dummies variables for early, mid, and late segments of SIPP panels.  Estimates employ sampling weights.  Standard 
errors (in parentheses) correct for clustering by the 240 monthly periods 





Wage group → 
 
 




2.25 2.74 3.17 2.10 2.54 
1 
2.99 





5.2  4.1 21.7 9.5 5.3 
Monthly rate from working to 
 not working (%) 
 
2.94 1.35 1.03 3.96 1.97 1.23 
Monthly rate from not working 
 to working (%) 
 
22.7 25.1 23.6 15.2 19.2 21.8 
Mean net wealth/family income 
 
 
15.7 17.7 22.9 18.5 19.6 22.1 
 
Overall sample is 2,053,116 for men and 2,315,159 for women.  Sample sizes are smaller for separation rates and, particularly, for searching and 
finding rates (e.g., for finding rates samples sizes are 131,050 for men and 271,048 for women.)  Estimates employ sampling weights.  Low-wage 
for men means hourly wage (Dec 2004 dollars) below $12.74.  High-wage means greater than $18.80.  The respective cutoffs for women are 
$10.42 and $15.28. Table 7:  Cyclicality of Employment and Unemployment by Long-term Wage 





Wage group → 
 
 ↓ Dependent variable  














































Regressions include variables for marital status, age and age
2, linear and quadratic time trends, dummy variables for early, mid, and late segments 
of SIPP panels, and seasonal dummies.  Estimates employ sampling weights.  Standard errors reflect clustering by monthly period.  Low-wage for 
men is hourly wage (Dec 2004 dollars) below $12.74.  High-wage is greater than $18.80.  The respective cutoffs for women are $10.42 and 
$15.28. 










↓ Dependent variable   Mean  Response to 
Unemployment Rate 
 
Mean Response  to 
Unemployment Rate 
 























Out of employment,  






No. of observations 
 
382,056 / 216  416,369 / 216 
 
Regressions in columns 2 and 4 control for years of schooling, marital status, age, age
2, individual fixed effect in wage, monthly seasonals, linear 
and quadratic time trends, and dummies variables for early, mid, and late segments of SIPP panels.  Estimates employ sampling weights.  Standard 
errors (in parentheses) correct for clustering by the 240 monthly periods.   Table 9: Wage Cyclicality 
 





 All  workers 
 
New hires  Other workers  All workers 
 
















No. of observations 
 
470,252 72,488  397,764 504,771 91,438  413,333 
 
Estimation allows individual fixed effects.  Standard errors (in parentheses) correct for clustering by the 224 to 232 monthly periods.  Regressions 
control for age, age
2, and monthly seasonals.  Estimates employ sampling weights. 
 Table 10: Wage Cyclicality across Workers 





  New hires  Other workers 
 
New hires  Other workers 
 
   
Panel A 











No. of observations 
 
72,485 397,763 91,431  413,332 
   
Panel B 






















No. of observations 
 
68,174 372,293 86,836  390,237 
 
Estimation allows individual fixed effects.  Standard errors correct for clustering by 224 to 232 monthly periods.  Regressions control for age, 
age
2, and seasonals.  In addition to reported variables, regressions include the unemployment rate and interactions of age and age
2 with the 
unemployment rate.  Estimates employ sampling weights.  The relative labor supplied reflects the worker’s measured fixed effect in labor, which 
excludes the prior two months, current, and subsequent three months to the month determining the dependent variable. The relative wage reflects 
the workers fixed effect in ln(wage).  Low assets equals one if net wealth is not positive or unsecured debt is greater than 1000 hours of wages, 
zero otherwise.  16.7% of the sample for men and 21.1% of the sample for women has low assets by this measure.Table 11: Cyclicality in Separations from Employment across Workers 
  
 Men  Women 
 
Dependent variable → 
 
 
Return to employer 
 
No return to 
employer 
 
Return to employer 
 
Not return to 
employer 
 
 Panel  A 











No. of observations 
 
381,052 413,197 
 Panel  B 


























Standard errors correct for clustering by 208 to 216 monthly periods.  Regressions additionally include the unemployment rate and controls for 
years of schooling, marital status, age, age
2, individual fixed effect in wage, dummy for low assets, monthly seasonals, linear and quadratic time 
trends, and dummies variables for early, mid, and late segments of SIPP panels.  Also included are interactions of each reported variable with 
linear and quadratic trends and interactions of age and age
2 with time trends and the unemployment rate.  Estimates employ sampling weights.  
The relative labor supplied reflects the worker’s measured fixed effect in labor, which excludes the prior two months, current, and subsequent 
three months to the month determining the dependent variable. The relative wage reflects the workers fixed effect in ln(wage).  Low assets equals 
one if net wealth is not positive or if unsecured debt is greater than 1000 hours of wages, zero otherwise.  16.7% of the sample for men and 21.1% 
of the sample for women has low wealth by this measure. Figure 1: Steady State Value Functions and Wages (Benchmark)


































JFigure 2: Steady State Distributions and Separation Decision Rules (Benchmark)







































































µ(:,x) x*(a)Figure 3: Separation and Findings Rates (Benchmark)

















































log uFigure 4: Unemployment rate and ﬁxed-eﬀect in labor for employed and not employed




































Unemp. Rate (left scale)
Labor fixed effect (right scale)
Labor fixed effect (right scale)